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Though the U.S. federal investment tax credit (ITC) was permanently repealed in 1986, state-
level ITCs have proliferated over the last few decades.  Are these tax incentives effective in 
increasing investment within the state?  How much of this increase is due to investment 
drawn away from other states?  Based on a panel dataset for all 50 states, we find a significant 
channel for state tax incentives on own-state economic activity and document the importance 
of interstate capital flows.  Whether state investment incentives are a zero-sum game is less 
certain and depends on the definition of the set of competitive states.   
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State Investment Tax Incentives:  A Zero-Sum Game? 
I.  Introduction 
Though the U.S. federal investment tax credit (ITC) was permanently repealed in 
1986, ITC's at the state level and other state investment tax incentives have proliferated over 
the past two decades.  As shown in Figure 1, 40% of states now offer a general, state-wide 
tax credit on investment in machinery and buildings, and the average rate of this credit 
exceeds 6 percentage points in 2004.  The abundance of state investment tax incentives raises 
an important empirical question  -- are these tax incentives effective in increasing investment 
and economic activity within the state?  Academic research is far from a consensus on this 
point.  Fisher and Peters 1998, pp. 12-13) state that "[I]n the case of the first argument 
[economic development incentives probably can influence firm location and expansion 
decisions…], the literature is massive but still inconclusive;…"  In his survey paper, 
Wasylenko (1997, p. 38) concludes that elasticities of various forms of economic activity to 
tax policy "are not very reliable and change depending on which variables are included in the 
estimation equation or which time period is analyzed."  By contrast, an overview of papers 
(including Wasylenko's study) presented at a conference focusing on the effectiveness of state 
and local taxes reports that there was general agreement that state and local policies affect 
economic activity within their borders, though the effects "are generally modest" (Bradbury, 
Kodrzycki, and Tannenwald, 1997, p. 1).  A similar conclusion is reached in the encyclopedia 
entry by Bogart and Anderson (2005) concerning the effects of state policies on firm location.  
Perhaps the title of the report by McGuire (2003) sums up the current state of the scholarly 
empirical literature -- "Do Taxes Matter? Yes, No, Maybe So."  
  To the extent these incentives are effective in raising investment within the state, a 
second question arises from a national perspective -- how much of this increase is due to 
investment being drawn away from other states?  As noted by Stark and Wilson (2006), 
surprisingly few empirical studies have addressed this question.  Understanding the source of 
the increase in capital formation (or other economic activities) is important for assessing 
whether the increase merely reflects a zero-sum game among states and for informing 
discussions about the constitutionality of certain state tax incentives in light of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.
1  
                                                 
1 Regarding the Commerce Clause, see the papers in the special section of the Georgetown Journal of 
Law & Public Policy (2006) and the session on “Are State Business Tax Incentive Good Public 
Policy?” in the National Tax Association Proceedings 2006.    
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Figure 1.  State Investment Tax Credits: 
       Number of States with a Credit (left vertical axis) and 
       Average Credit Rate (right vertical axis) 







  These two questions are addressed in this paper with a comprehensive panel dataset 
covering all 50 states for 20+ years (depending on the series).  This dataset allows us to 
construct variables tied tightly to theory and to utilize a variety of powerful econometric 
techniques.  Panel data have the decided advantages of allowing us to control for factors such 
as infrastructure and location that are fixed or change slowly over time and for aggregate 
effects such as the business cycle.  The relative scarcity of empirical research on interstate 
capital mobility and tax competition may be traceable in good part to the absence of 
comprehensive data.  Section 2 describes the panel dataset that is drawn from a several 
sources, including the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, national data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and a variety of sources of information on state tax rates.  Details 
















Notes:  Counted investment tax credits (ITCs) include only general, statewide ITCs.  Excluded are ITCs targetted at specific 
geographic zones ("Enterprise" zones) or at specific industries.
Data Source:  Authors' calculations based on state corporate tax forms.
Credit Rate  Number of States with Tax Credit (Bars) 
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  We then develop and estimate three models in the subsequent three sections.  Section 
3 contains a Capital Demand Model motivated by a standard first-order condition relating the 
capital stock to output and the user cost of capital.  We specify the latter as the ratio of a 
states own user cost of capital relative to the user cost of capital for a competitive set of 
states.  The user cost of capital is based on the Hall-Jorgenson concept that relies on the 
equivalence between renting and owning a durable asset.  Based on this insight, durable 
capital can be assigned a rental price that easily incorporates a variety of tax parameters and 
can be analyzed with the traditional tools of price theory.  We find that a state’s capital 
intensity decreases with the user cost prevailing in the state but increases with the user cost 
available in competitive states, thus documenting the importance of interstate capital flows 
that is a necessary element for meaningful tax competition.  Whether state investment 
incentives are a zero-sum game among the states is less certain and depends on the definition 
of the set of competitive states.   
  Sections 4 and 5 estimate two models explaining the location of manufacturing 
establishments at the county level.  The first model, which follows the spatial regression 
discontinuity design of Holmes (1998), posits that manufacturing activity varies smoothly 
across space and then utilizes the information generated by spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) 
in tax policy at state borders.  We apply Holmes' Spatial Discontinuity Model to assess the 
effects of a particular tax policy, relatively higher user costs.  The evidence provides weak 
support for the role of state tax policy but is sensitive to the year in which the analysis is 
undertaken.  Our second model, which we call the Twin-Counties Model, takes advantage of 
the panel structure of our data and exploits the "natural experiment" afforded by pairs of 
counties that are in the same geographic area but are separated by a state border.  Comparing 
the differential outcomes of county pairs with common geographic conditions but differing 
state policies is akin to the twin studies employed frequently in labor economics and medical 
research, which analyze the differential outcomes of identical twins with common genetic 
conditions but different environmental conditions.  The Twin-Counties Model uncovers a 
strong effect of user costs prevailing at the state level on the location of establishments at the 
county level.  Moreover, consistent with significant interstate capital flows, we document that 
this effect increases monotonically as the distance between paired-counties decreases.   





2.  The Panel Dataset  
The state data constructed and used in this paper measure economic activity in the 
manufacturing sector for all 50 states.  This data set may be thought of as a state-level analog 
to other widely used data sets, such as the industry-level NBER Productivity Database or 
Dale Jorgenson’s “KLEM” database or the country-level Penn World Tables. This section 
provides a cursory overview of the construction of the five key series used in this paper:  two 
quantity variables (output (Y) and the capital stock (K)), their tax-adjusted prices (P
Y and P
K, 
respectively), and a fifth series for the number of establishments (NE).  The quantity series 
are available from 1982 to 2004; the price series from 1963 to 2004; and the NE series from 
1977 to 2004.  Substantially more detail can be found in the appendix. 
  The primary raw source data for the nominal output (Y$), nominal investment (I$), 
and NE series is the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Since these series all come from a single, representative-survey-based source, they 
are of fairly high quality.  The ASM data are collected from a large, representative sample of 
manufacturing establishments with one or more paid employees.  The 2004 ASM (Appendix 
B, p. B-1) defines the manufacturing sector as follows, 
 
The Manufacturing sector comprises establishments engaged in the 
mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of materials, 
substances, or components into new products. …..  Establishments in 
the manufacturing sector are often described as plants, factories, or 
mills and characteristically use power-driven machines and materials-
handling equipment.  However, establishments that transform materials 
or substances into new products by hand or in the worker’s home and 
those engaged in selling to the general public products made on the 
same premises from which they are sold, such as bakeries, candy 
stores, and custom tailors, may also be included in this sector.   
 
The ASM manufacturing sector corresponds to NAICS sectors 31 to 33.   
  The Y series equals Y$ deflated by a manufacturing output price index. 
  Capital stock data useful in economic analyses are not obtainable from raw sources 
but must be constructed from various series.  The K series is computed according to a 
perpetual inventory formula based on real investment data (I) and depreciation rates.  The I 
series equals I$ deflated by a price index for investment.  
 The  P
K series is based on the concept introduced by Jorgenson (1963) and developed 
and expanded by, among others, Gravelle (1994), Hall and Jorgenson (1971), Jorgenson and 
Yun (2001), and King and Fullerton (1984).  This series is defined as the product of three  
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objects reflecting tax credits and deductions ( s,t TAX ), the purchase price of the capital good 
( s,t PRICE ), and the opportunity costs of holding depreciating capital ( s,t OPPCOST ),   
 
    K
s,t s,t s,t s,t P TAX *PRICE *OPPCOST = , (1a) 
 
()
L,S L,F E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t t s,t s,t
E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t
TAX 1 ITC ITC ( )TD
1( ) P T
=− − −τ + τ
+− τ + τ
 (1b)   
 
I
s,t mfg,t PRICE P = , (1c) 
 




s,t ITC  and  L,F
t ITC  are the legislated investment tax credit rates at the state and 
federal levels, respectively,  E,S
s,t τ  and  E,F
t τ  are the effective corporate income tax rates at the 
state and federal levels, respectively,  s,t TD  is the present value of tax depreciation 
allowances at the federal level,  s,t PT  is the present value of property tax payments at the state 
level,  I
mfg,t P  is the price deflator for investment in the manufacturing sector,  t ρ  is the 
financial cost of capital, and  mfg,t δ  is the economic depreciation rate in the manufacturing 
sector.  The  K
s,t P  series and its eight components are stated at annual rates and in continuous 
time.   
  The user cost of capital concept is a relative price and is defined as follows, 
 
    KY
s,t s,t s,t UC P /P = ,             ( 2 )  
 
where  ()
Y BT,Y E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t mfg,t PP 1 ⎡⎤ =− τ + τ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 is the price of output adjusted for corporate income 
taxes and  BT,Y
mfg,t P  is the price of output before taxes. 
  Summary statistics for the variables entering the estimating equations are provided in 
Table 1.    
 
6
Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
 
  Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
  (1) 
 
(2) (3) 
kyt  -.2242475 -.2745625  .349972 
uc-ownt  -1.397476 -1.402759  .0613904 
UC-ownt  .2476925 .2459175  .015543 
uc-compt {border}  -1.395391 -1.397862  .0521876 
UC-compt {border}  .2480744 .2471248  .0130181 
uc-compt {5}  -1.384204 -1.394071  .065186 
UC-compt {5}  .2510698 .2480634  .0170703 
uc-compt {10}  -1.383383 -1.390204  .0553564 
UC-compt {10}  .2511203 .2490244  .0143214 
uc-compt {all}  -1.383511 -1.38322  .043599 
UC-compt {all}  .2509382 .2507698  .0111752 
 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
Variables are defined in the tables below.  The standard deviations are computed with state or 
county fixed effects removed by subtracting time-series means.  The words in brackets 
indicate whether the competitive set of states is defined by the bordering states, the five 





3.  Capital Demand Model  
The first of the three models used to assess the own-state and competitive-states 
effects of state tax incentives is motivated by the first-order condition for optimal capital 
demand.  This condition is at the core of the vast majority of econometric equations of capital 
formation (Chirinko, 1993).  Sub-section 1 contains a derivation of the estimating equation 
containing the relative user cost of capital; that is, the own-state user cost relative to the 
competitive-states user cost.  Sub-section 2 explores the sensitivity of results to state and time 
fixed effects and to lags of the relative user cost.  For these results, the competitive set of 
states is defined as those bordering the state in question.  The overall user cost for the 
competitive set of states is a weighted-average of the individual user costs in those states, 
where the weights are inversely related to the distance between the state in question and the 
individual competitive states.  Sub-section 3 provides additional evidence when the 
competitive set of states is expanded to the 5 closest, 10 closest, or all other states, again 
weighted by inverse distance from the state in question.  Sub-section 4 replaces the relative  
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user cost by separate user costs for the own-state and competitive-states, and we can thus 
assess whether state tax incentives are a zero-sum game.        
 
3.1. Estimating Equation 
    We begin by assuming that production for state s at time t is characterized by the 
following Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology, 
 
    KL
s,t s,t s,t s,t s,t s,t Y Y[K ,L ,A ,B ,B ] =          ( 3 )  
     { }
[/ ( 1 ) ] K[ ( 1 ) / ] L[ ( 1 ) / ]
s,t s,t s,t s,t s,t A( B K ) ( 1 ) ( B L )
σ σ− σ− σ σ− σ =φ + − φ , 
 
where  s,t Y  is real output,  s,t K  is the real capital stock,  s,t L  is the level of labor input, φ is 
the capital distribution parameter, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital.  Technical progress is both neutral ( s,t A ), and biased for capital and labor 
( KL
s,t s,t Ba n d B ,  respectively).  Equation (3) is homogeneous of degree one in  s,t K  and  s,t L.   
  Constrained by the CES production function, a profit-maximizing firm chooses 
capital so that its marginal product equals the user cost of capital (defined above in equations 
(1) and (2)).  Differentiating equation (3) with respect to capital and rearranging terms, we 
obtain the following factor demand equation for capital,  
 
    s,t s,t s,t s,t K/ Y U C E σ− σ =φ ,                         (4a) 
      [1 ] [1 ]
s,t s,t s,t EA B σ− σ σ− σ ≡ ,                         (4b) 
 
where the error term,  s,t E , captures the effects of technical change.  We assume that  s,t E 
follows a two-way error component specification, 
 
    s,t s t s,t E exp[e e e ] =+ + ,                            (5)  
 
where state and aggregate fixed effects are captured by  s e  and  t e , respectively, and the 
remaining time-varying, state-specific error,  s,t e , may have a non-zero mean.  We augment  
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the first-order condition in two ways.  To allow for interstate capital flows, we replace the 
user cost by a relative user cost defined as the logarithm of the own-state user cost less the 
logarithm of the competitive-states user cost.  Moreover, lagged values of the relative user 
cost variable are included to capture dynamic responses to tax stimuli.  Taking logs of the 
first-order condition and augmenting the linear specification with lags of the relative user 
cost, we obtain the following estimating equation,  
 
    s,t 0 s,t 1 s,t 1 2 s,t 2 s t s,t ky ruc ruc ruc e e e −− =ζ+α +α +α + + + ,                 (6a) 
      s,t s,t s,t ky Ln[K /Y ], =                          (6b) 
      Ln[ ], ζ =σ φ                            (6c) 
      comp own
s,t s,t s,t ruc uc uc =−,                         (6d) 
       own
s,t s,t uc Ln[UC ] = ,          ( 6 e )  







∑ ,                     (6f) 
()
1
s,v distance between centroids for states s and v
− ς∝ ,             (6g) 
s,v
v
1 ς= ∑ ,                         (6h) 
      ruc
012 Ω= α + α + α ,          ( 6 i )  
 
where the user cost for the competitive set of states ( comp
s,t uc ) is defined in equation (6f) as 
the weighted-sum over the bordering states, the five closest states, or the ten closest states to 
state s, or over all states other than state s.  The weights are the inverse of the distance 
between the population centroids for state s and that of the competitive state v, normalized to 
sum to unity.  The impact of the user cost variables is assessed by Ω, which is the summation 
of the α's.   
  There are several noteworthy features of equations (6) for estimating the effects of 
relative state tax incentives.  First, the specification is parsimonious and linear, and tax policy 
effects are captured by the coefficients on the current and lagged values of the relative user 
cost term.  Second, the specification is robust to other factors that might affect production 
possibilities.  For example, location and geographical features that affect productivity and are  
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fixed through time are captured by the state fixed effect.  Other state-specific factors that vary 
through time, such as infrastructure stocks and human capital, can enter as additional factors 
of production.  Owing to the strong separability inherent in the CES function, these factors 
will not distort parameter estimates from equations (6) because their effects are absorbed by 
the output term appearing in the first-order condition.  Third, equation (6a) highlights the 
importance of state and time fixed effects, an issue that will be important in the empirical 
results to which we now turn.   
 
3.2. Initial Empirical Results 
  OLS estimates of equation (6a) are presented in Panels A-D of Table 2 for estimators 
that differ by the inclusion/exclusion of state and year fixed effects and by the number of 
lags.  In this subsection, we discuss the results from Panel A where the competitive user cost 
is defined for bordering states.  We begin in columns 1 to 4 with models containing only the 
current value of the relative user cost.  In column 1 with neither state nor time fixed effects,  
the coefficient on rucs,t, which is equivalent to Ω
ruc in models with only one relative user cost 
variable, is positive and statistically insignificant.  With the inclusion of state fixed effects in 
column 2, Ω
ruc is now negative but remains statistically insignificant.  Column 3 includes 
time fixed effects but excludes state fixed effects; Ω
ruc has a difficult-to-rationalize positive 
coefficient.  Column 4 includes both fixed effects, and Ω
ruc takes on an economically sensible 
and significant value of −.464 that is statistically different from zero.  Comparing column 4 
with both fixed effects to column 2 with only state fixed effects, we see that the inclusion of 
time fixed effects more than doubles the response of capital to its user cost, as Ω
ruc increases 





Table 2:   Capital Demand Model.  Equation (6a) with Various Lags 
       Dependent Variable:  Logarithm of the Capital/Output Ratio 
 
                 A.  Competitive User Cost for Bordering States 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
rucs,t  .449 -.201 .408 -.464    1.290 .372 1.415 .345    1.259 .346 1.385 .314 
  (.219) (.420) (.188) (.176)    (.773) (.733) (.684) (.400)    (.783) (.742) (.682) (.400) 
                    
rucs,t-1  ----- ----- ----- -----    -.876  -.647  -1.051  -.912    .342  -.094  .175  -.266 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    (.780)  (.717)  (.701)  (.376)   (1.148) (.994) (1.061) (.516) 
                    
rucs,t-2  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    -1.249  -.596  -1.256  -.697 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    (.894)  (.771)  (.799)  (.358) 
                    
Ω  .449 -.201 .408 -.464    .414 -.274 .365 -.567    .353 -.344 .304 -.649 
  (.219) (.420) (.188) (.176)    (.223) (.436) (.193) (.173)    (.229) (.450) (.201) (.176) 
                    
State  No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Time  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
                    
R
2  .0047 .0003 .4094 .7636    .0054 .0010 .4104 .7650    .0067 .0015 .4117 .7657 
N  1008 1008 1008 1008    1008 1008 1008 1008    1008 1008 1008 1008  
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Table 2:   Capital Demand Model.  Equation (6a) with Various Lags 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  Logarithm of the Capital/Output Ratio 
 
                 B.  Competitive User Cost for the Closest Five States 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
rucs,t  .456 1.258 .298 -.067    1.047  1.413 .820  .521    1.026  1.410 .801  .492 
  (.157) (.323) (.133) (.161)    (.789) (.669) (.716) (.395)    (.794) (.668) (.711) (.395) 
                    
rucs,t-1  ----- ----- ----- -----    -.617  -.177  -.544  -.673    .290  -.123  .284  -.081 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    (.834)  (.683)  (.754)  (.383)   (1.166) (.879) (1.090) (.522) 
                    
rucs,t-2  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    -.928 -.058 -.850 -.652 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    (.923)  (.703)  (.839)  (.383) 
                    
Ω  .456 1.258 .298 -.067    .430 1.236 .275 -.152    .387 1.228 .235 -.241 
  (.157) (.323) (.133) (.161)    (.167) (.337) (.141) (.160)    (.180) (.357) (.152) (.166) 
                    
State  No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Time  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
                    
R
2  .0073 .0127 .3967 .7501    .0076 .0128 .3969 .7508    .0083 .0128 .3974 .7514 




Table 2:   Capital Demand Model.  Equation (6a) with Various Lags 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  Logarithm of the Capital/Output Ratio 
 
                 C.  Competitive User Cost for the Closest Ten States 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
rucs,t  .762  1.490  .525  -.361    1.776 1.809 1.390  .421    1.741 1.803 1.361  .387 
  (.177) (.348) (.151) (.184)    (.802) (.692) (.731) (.434)    (.811) (.693) (.723) (.433) 
                    
rucs,t-1  ----- ----- ----- -----    -1.058  -.362  -.901  -.891    .272  -.236  .215  -.271 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    (.832)  (.703)  (.761)  (.414)   (1.181) (.902) (1.138) (.553) 
                    
rucs,t-2  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    -1.358  -.136  -1.141  -.674 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    (.918)  (.719)  (.873)  (.396) 
                    
Ω  .762 1.490 .525 -.361    .719 1.448 .488 -.470    .655 1.430 .434 -.557 
  (.177) (.348) (.151) (.184)    (.183) (.364) (.158) (.181)    (.192) (.384) (.167) (.186) 
                    
State  No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Time  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
                    
R
2  .0157 .0151 .4010 .7509    .0166 .0152 .4016 .7520    .0179 .0153 .4025 .7526 




Table 2:   Capital Demand Model.  Equation (6a) with Various Lags 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  Logarithm of the Capital/Output Ratio 
 
                 D.  Competitive User Cost for All States 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
rucs,t  .978  1.888  .648  -.480    2.158 1.910 1.700  .180    2.102 1.916 1.655  .153 
  (.218) (.349) (.188) (.202)    (.830) (.690) (.761) (.449)    (.842) (.687) (.750) (.449) 
                    
rucs,t-1  ----- ----- ----- -----    -1.223  -.025  -1.089  -.755    .404  -.119  .232  -.303 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    (.863)  (.686)  (.792)  (.417)   (1.220) (.884) (1.187) (.545) 
                    
rucs,t-2  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    -1.640  .101  -1.332  -.488 
  ----- ----- ----- -----    ----- ----- ----- -----    (.945)  (.697)  (.918)  (.383) 
                    
Ω  .978 1.888 .648 -.480    .936 1.885 .611 -.575    .866 1.898 .555 -.638 
  (.218) (.349) (.188) (.202)    (.225) (.361) (.195) (.198)    (.233) (.381) (.204) (.204) 
                    
State  No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Time  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
                    
R
2  .0199 .0204 .4022 .7513    .0211 .0204 .4031 .7521    .0228 .0204 .4043 .7523 





Notes to Table 2:    
OLS estimates are based on panel data for 50 states (save Panel A, which excludes Alaska 
and Hawaii) for the period 1982 to 2004.  Estimates are based on equation (6a); given the two 
lags, the effective sample is for the period 1984 to 2004.  The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the capital/output ratio for state s (kys,t).  The independent variable is the relative 
user cost for state s (rucs,t) defined as the logarithm of the own-state user cost relative to the 
logarithm of the competitive-states user cost.  The competitive set of states is defined over the 
bordering states (Panel A), the five closest states (Panel B), or the ten closest states (Panel C) 
to state s, or over all states other than state s (Panel D).  The competitive user cost is a 
weighted-average of these state user costs, where the weights are the inverse of the distance 
between the population centroids for state s and that of a competitive state, normalized to sum 
to unity.  See Section 3 and the Data Appendix for further details about data sources and 
construction.  The models in columns (1), (5), and (9) contain no fixed effects (when state 
fixed effects are absent, a constant term is included); the models in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), 
(10), and (12) contain state fixed effects; the models in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11) and 
(12) contain time fixed effects.  The Ω parameter is the summation of the immediately 
preceding point estimates on the rucs,t variables.  Standard errors are heteroscedastic 
consistent using the technique of White (1980); the standard error for Ω is the sum of the 
underlying variances and covariances raised to the one-half power.  The R
2 measures the 




  These combinations of fixed effect estimations are repeated in columns 5 to 8 and 9 to 
12 for models with one and two additional lags, respectively.  In order to enhance 
comparability across models, the sample is identical for the zero, one, and two lag models.  
The pattern of Ω
ruc ’s with respect to state and time fixed effects reported in the above 
paragraph is the same in these lag models.  For the preferred models with both fixed effects, 
the Ω
ruc 's increase (in absolute value) with additional lags, rising from −.464 with zero lags to 
−.567 and −.649 with one and two additional lags, respectively. (Further lags had a negligible 
impact on Ω
ruc, and those results are not reported in Table 2.)  These estimates imply a 
sizeable impact of state investment tax credits.  In 2004, a 1 percentage point (100 basis 
point) increase in the own-state investment tax credit for the “average” state would lead to a 
.62%, .76%, or .87% increase in the capital stock, holding output and the competitive-state 
user cost constant.   
  In sum, these results reveal a substantial impact of individual state tax policies 
operating though the user cost on capital formation and highlight the importance of 





3.3. Additional Competitive States 
  The above results are based on the assumption that the competitive user cost was for 
states that border state s.  Panels B through D in Table 2 expand the set of competing states 
by defining the competitive user cost for the five closest, ten closest, and all other states.  The 
previously discussed results about the impact of fixed effects and the role of the user cost are 
largely confirmed in these models with additional competitive states.  One notable exception, 
however, is that, when the competitive user cost is defined for the five closest states in Panel 
B, the coefficients of the relative user cost on capital formation remain negative (in the 
preferred model with both state and time effects) but are not statistically significant.    
 
3.4. Zero-Sum Game?  
  The prior results suggest that a state’s investment tax policy, relative to that of its 
neighboring states, strongly affects capital formation within the state.  This sub-section 
examines the separate responses of own-state capital formation to own-state and competitive-
states tax policies.  The latter effect allows us to quantify the extent to which interstate capital 
flows impede own-state capital formation.  We estimate the following more general model 
with own and competitive user costs entered separately, 
 
   
own own own
s,t 0 s,t 1 s,t 1 2 s,t 2
comp comp comp
012s t s , t s,t s,t 1 s,t 2
ky uc uc uc




+γ +γ +γ + + +
  .     (7) 
 
The β's and the γ's capture the own-state and competitive-states tax effects, respectively.  
Insofar as there is competition for scarce capital resources and competitive tax rates affect 
capital formation in state s, the sum of the γ's, as represented by  uc comp − Ω , will be positive.  
Alternatively, if capital is provided perfectly elastically, then the γ's will equal zero.  Note 
that equation (7) reduces to equation (6a) under the restriction  jj j −β =γ ∀ .     
  OLS estimates of equation (7), as well as equation (6a), are presented in Table 3 for 
models with current and two lags of the user cost variables and state and time fixed effects.  
As a benchmark, column 1 shows the results for the standard capital demand model 
containing only the own-state user cost (a special case of equation (7) where  j 0j γ =∀ ).  Not 
surprisingly given the prior results, the sum of the coefficients on the distributed lag of 
own




from an omitted variables bias due to the possible own-state effect of competitive states’ user 
costs.  Columns 2 and 3 are based on a competitive user cost defined for bordering states.  
Column 2 is simply replicated from equation (6a) presented in Table 2.  Looking at column 3, 
the sum of the β's, as represented by  uc own − Ω , are larger (in absolute value) than the 
comparable sum from the constrained model in column 2.  Moreover,  uc comp − Ω  is positive 
and statistically significant.  The sum of  uc own uc comp −− Ω+ Ω equals -.144, which implies 
that, if both own-state and competitive-states user costs rise by 10%, the own-state’s capital-
output ratio will fall by 1.44%.  However, it is important to note the sum of these coefficients 
is not statistically significantly different from zero.   
The results for the other three measures of the set of competitive states are 
qualitatively similar, though differences exist.  Here we examine to what extent own-state 
capital formation is affected by the competitive-state user cost.  In all three cases, 
uc comp − Ω is positive and in two cases statistically significant.  These results suggest that state 
tax incentives have empirically important interstate effects.    
We evaluate whether these interstate effects lead to a zero-sum game by the extent to 
which own-state and competitive-state user cost effects cancel in terms of the sum of 
uc own uc comp −− Ω+ Ω .  For the four sets of competitive-states listed in Table 3, these sums 
(with standard errors in parentheses) equal -.144 (.287) [discussed above], -.505 (.264), .231 
(.324), and 1.634 (.575).  Thus, for the bordering states and the ten closest states, the sums are 
statistically close to zero.  However, the net effect is significantly negative for the five closest 
states and significantly positive for all states.  We are thus unable to draw a firm conclusion 




Table 3:   Capital Demand Model:  Equations (6a) and (7)  
       Dependent Variable:  Logarithm of the Capital/Output Ratio 
 All 
States 
 Bordering   
States 
 Closest  Five 
States 
 Closest  Ten 
States 
 All   
States 
  (1)   (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)   (6)  (7)   (8)  (9) 
rucs,t  -----   .314 -----    .491  -----   .387  -----   .153 ----- 
  -----   (.400)  -----    (.395) -----   (.434) -----   (.449)  ----- 
                        
rucs,t-1  -----   -.266 -----    -.081  -----   -.271  -----   -.303 ----- 
  -----   (.516)  -----    (.522) -----   (.553) -----   (.545)  ----- 
                        
rucs,t-2  -----   -.697 -----    -.652  -----   -.674  -----   -.487 ----- 
  -----   (.358)  -----    (.383) -----   (.396) -----   (.383)  ----- 
                        
Ω
ruc  -----   -.649  -----    -.241  -----   -.557  -----   -.638  ----- 
 -----    (.176)  -----    (.166)  -----    (.186)  -----    (.204)  ----- 
                        
uc-owns,t  .037   ----- -.026    -----  .125   -----  .133   ----- .055 
  (.450)  ----- (.446)   -----  (.444)  -----  (.438)  ----- (.440) 
                        
uc- 
owns,t-1 
-.265   ----- -.267   -----  -.264  -----  -.252   ----- -.260 
  (.537)  ----- (.536)   -----  (.526)  -----  (.527)  ----- (.526) 
                        
uc- 
owns,t-2 
-.301   ----- -.412   -----  -.385  -----  -.438   ----- -.358 
  (.375)  ----- (.372)   -----  (.373)  -----  (.377)  ----- (.374) 
                        
Ω
uc-own  -.529   ----- -.705   -----  -.523  -----  -.557   ----- -.563 
  (.209)  ----- (.205)   -----  (.214)  -----  (.211)  ----- (.210) 
                        
uc-
comps,t 
-----   -----  -1.356    ----- -1.217    ----- -2.486    -----  -6.918 
  -----   -----  (.772)    ----- (.734)    ----- (1.159)    -----  (2.578) 
                        
uc-
comps,t-1 
-----   ----- .342    -----  -.586    -----  .459   -----  2.265 
  -----   -----  (1.102)    ----- (1.148)    ----- (1.693)    -----  (3.812) 
                        
uc-
comps,t-2 
-----   -----  1.574    -----  1.821    ----- 2.815    -----  6.849 
  -----   -----  (.737)    ----- (.833)    ----- (1.176)    -----  (2.681) 
                        
Ω
uc-comp  -----   ----- .561    -----  .018   -----  .788   -----  2.196 
 -----    -----  (.251)    -----  (.218)    -----  (.297)    -----  (.562) 
                        
State  Yes   Yes Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes 
Time  Yes   Yes Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes 
R
2  .7514   .7657  .7670    .7514  .7533   .7526 .7546   .7523  .7556 




Notes to Table 3:    
OLS estimates are based on panel data for 50 states (save columns 2 and 3, which 
excludeAlaska and Hawaii) for the period 1982 to 2004.  Estimates reported in columns (1), 
(3), (5), (7), and (9) are based on equation (7) and in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) are based 
on equation (6a).  Given the two lags, the effective sample is for the period 1984 to 2004.  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the capital/output ratio for state s (kys,t).  The 
independent variables in columns (2), (4), and (6) are the logarithm of the user cost for state s 
(uc-owns,t) and the logarithm of the user cost for competitive states (uc-comps,t).  The 
competitive set of states is defined over the bordering states (columns 2 and 3), the five 
closest states (columns 4 and 5), or the ten closest states (columns 6 and 7) to state s, or over 
all states other than state s (columns 1, 8, and 9).  The competitive user cost is a weighted-
average of these state user costs, where the weights are the inverse of the distance between 
the population centroids for state s and that of a competitive state, normalized to sum to unity.  
See Section 3 and the Data Appendix for further details about data sources and construction.  
All models contain fixed state and time effects.  The Ω parameter is the summation of the 
three immediately preceding point estimates.  Standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent 
using the technique of White (1980); the standard error for Ω is the sum of the underlying 
variances and covariances raised to the one-half power.  The R
2 measures the amount of 





4.  Spatial Discontinuity Model  
A key problem confronting applied work on the impacts of government policy is 
separating policy effects, which are the primary object of our analysis, from the nonpolicy 
effects, which are undoubtedly quantitatively important but not of immediate interest.  In the 
previous section, we relied on the first-order condition for capital demand to impose the 
required separation.  This section addresses the key problem in an alternative way by 
exploiting the spatial discontinuity in tax policies that occurs at state borders.  This strategy 
was pioneered by Holmes (1998) in his study of right-to-work laws and other “pro-business” 
policies on the location of manufacturing activity.  We apply Holmes' model to the study of 
state tax polices in this section, and the evidence weakly supports the efficacy of state tax 
policy.  
 
4.1. Estimating Equation 
  Holmes (1998) develops several different tests for identifying the effects of pro-
business regulations.  This section follows the development of the cross-section model 





    cc c c MA nonpolicy policy e =+ θ + ,                   (8a) 
       cb c b c c nonpolicy f [x ] g [x ]dist = + ,                   (8b) 
   2
c0 , b 1 , b c2 , b c3 , bc nonpolicy x x dist =η +η +η +η ,               (8c) 
 
where c indexes counties (about 3000 in the 48 contiguous U.S. states) and b indexes the 109 
state borders.  Equation (8a) is a general decomposition between nonpolicy and policy 
influences on the manufacturing activity (MAc) in county c.  Our primary measure of MAc is 
the five-year growth in the number of manufacturing establishments in the county; we also 
use the share of employment in manufacturing as an alternative measure of MAc.  Holmes 
proposes a unique method for modeling the nonpolicy influences on the establishment growth 
based on two geographic characteristics of county c -- distc, the minimum distance from the 
population centroid for county c to its closest state border, and xc, the distance between an 
arbitrary fixed point (on this closest border) and the point along the border that minimizes the 
distance from the population centroid (Holmes refers to xc as the “milemark”).  The focus on 
state borders is critical to the analysis.  "At state borders, the geographic determinants of the 
distribution of manufacturing ….. are approximately the same on both sides of the border" 
(Holmes, 1998, p. 671).  Holmes' method depends on distc and the polynomial 
approximations in xc given by fb[.] and gb[.] to map the geographic data of the counties into a 
Cartesian plane in order to isolate the geographic determinants of the distribution of 
manufacturing (see Holmes (1998, Sections II.B and 4) for further discussion).
2  The 
polynomial approximations are presented in equation (8c).  Note that these approximations 
are only valid for a given year, and hence the model must be estimated as a cross-section.  
With panel data, the η's in the following equation must be reestimated for each year,  
 
    2
c,t 0bt 1bt c 2bt c 3bt c t c,t c,t MA x x dist policy e =η +η +η +η +θ + .            (9) 
 
If tax effects captured by the user cost are important for manufacturing activity, the 
coefficient on the policy variable, θt, will be negative.   
 
4.2.  Empirical Results 
                                                 





  Equation (9) is estimated with two measures of policy and our primary measure of 
manufacturing activity, the five-year growth in the number of manufacturing establishments 
in the county (i.e., between period t and t-5).  Both policy variables reflect the user costs for 
the states in which counties c’ and c” are located (rucc,t).  The first policy variable is closest to 
that used by Holmes, and defines an “anti-business” variable as an indicator variable in terms 
of the ratio of user costs lagged five years,   
 




anti-business 1 if ruc 1





.                  (10b) 
 
The coefficients on anti-business from estimating model (9), separately for each year from 
1982 to 2004, are presented in Figure 2.  For most years other than 1991 to 1993, the θ 
coefficient is positive and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  However, for these three 
years, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.   
  The second policy variable replaces the anti-business indicator variable by the 
continuous relative user costs variable, rucc,t-5, and the results are presented in Figure 3.   
Figure 2. Coefficients on ANTIBUSINESSt-5, by year
Dependent Variable:  5-year symmetric growth in establishment count













Figure 3. Coefficients on ln(RUCt-5), by year
Dependent Variable:  5-year symmetric growth in establishment count
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Similar to the results from model (9), the coefficient on the relative user cost generally is 
insignificantly different from zero, but is negative and significant in four years, 1990 to 
1993.
3   
  These estimates may be biased by the possible endogeneity of the user cost variable.  
In principle, endogeneity might arise because productivity or other shocks to employment 
growth equation are correlated with changes in the non-tax components of the user cost.  This 
effect may largely cancel in our relative user cost variable, so we doubt that this channel 
seriously biases our estimates.  An operative channel might exist if shocks affect state tax 
variables.  This endogenous policy channel, coupled with the general possibility of 
measurement error, might lead to biased estimates.  To investigate the potential bias, we 
reestimate the equation with policy measured by a continuous variables rucs,t-5 (i.e., the 
                                                 
3 The share of employment in manufacturing was used by Holmes as a second measure of 
manufacturing activity.  We prefer the growth rate measure for two reasons:  (1) state investment tax 
incentives benefit all industries, not just manufacturing, and hence may have little impact on 
manufacturing’s share of employment, and (2) it will be robust to time invariant policy effects 
occurring at the county level.  Nonetheless, we reestimate equation (9) with employment share as the 
dependent variable and the continuous policy measure as the independent variable.  The OLS 
estimates of θ are positive in all but two years and about one-half of the yearly coefficients are 





results presented in Figure 3) using rucc,t-6, rucc,t-7, and rucc,t-8, as instruments.  The IV point 
estimates and standard errors are very similar to those displayed in Figure 3.  The IV point 
estimates continue to be statistically far from zero for the period 1990 to 1993.  Endogeneity 
does not affect our overall conclusions.
4 
  In sum, these results with the Spatial Discontinuity Model provide weak support for 
the role of state tax policy but also indicate that the evidence is sensitive to the year in which 
the analysis is undertaken.  A series of cross-sectional data or panel data prove useful in 
avoiding this sensitivity.   
 
 
5.  Twin-Counties Model  
In this section, we develop a novel alternative estimation framework in the spirit of 
Holmes that takes advantage of the panel structure of our dataset.  This new model exploits 
the “natural experiment” afforded by pairs of counties in the same geographic area but 
separated by a state border.  Thus, as in the Spatial Discontinuity Model, these counties are 
affected by similar nonpolicy factors but dissimilar tax policies.  Comparing differential 
outcomes of pairs of counties with common geographic conditions but different state policies 
is akin to the twin studies employed frequently in labor economics and medical research, 
which analyze the differential outcomes of identical twins with common genetic but different 
environmental conditions (e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).  The Twin-Counties Model 
uncovers a strong effect of state-level user costs on the location of establishments at the 
county level.  
 
5.1. Estimating Equation 
  The essential piece of information generated by bordering counties is that the non-
policy effects are identical at the border.  Holmes measures these non-policy effects through 
polynomial approximations of geographic characteristics.  In our framework, we continue to 
rely on the information generated at the border but develop a different model to identify 
policy effects.  Consider the following general decomposition for the number of 
manufacturing establishments in a pair of neighboring counties that are in different states, 
 
                                                 
4 Instrumental variables estimation is not feasible in the capital demand model because, since state 





    c',t c' t c',t c',t c',t ne nonpolicy policy e =α +β + +θ + ,                 (11a) 
    c'',t c'' t c''.t c'',t c'',t ne nonpolicy policy e =α +β + +θ + ,                 (11b) 
 
where nec,t (c=c’,c”) is the logarithm of the number of establishments, αc is a county fixed 
effect (that can incorporate distance from the population centroid to the border, position along 
the closest state border, latitude, longitude, climate, etc.), βt is a time fixed effect impacting 
both counties equally, nonpolicyc,t represents one or more nonpolicy variables, policyc,t can 
represent one or more policy variables but it should be equated to the user cost for the 
development of this particular model, ec,t is an error term, and θ is the parameter of interest.  
The key identifying assumption of the model is that, around a state border, counties c’ and c” 
are “twins” and hence nonpolicyc’,t = nonpolicyc”,t.  We exploit this relation by taking cross-
county differences of a pair of twin-counties (labeled p),  
 
    p,t p p,t p,t ne policy e ∇= α + θ ∇ + ,                   (12a) 
        p,t c',t c'',t ne ne ne ∇≡ − ,                   (12b) 
        p,t c',t c'',t p,t policy uc uc ruc ∇≡ − ≡ ,                   (12c) 
 
where the county fixed effects have been absorbed into αp, the βt's cancel by construction, and 
the nonpolicy variables cancel by the twins assumption.  The policy variable that enters 
equation (12a) is a relative user cost (rucp,t), where the relative relation is drawn across a pair 
of twin-counties.  If state tax investment incentives are effective, we would expect θ to be 
negative and statistically significant.   
  The Twin-Counties Model permits an additional test of tax efficacy and tax 
competition.  We would expect policy to be more effective the closer are the paired counties, 
where closesness is measured by the distance between the population centroids for twin 
counties, c’ and c”, forming a pair.  Establishments in close counties (separated by a border) 
may be more likely to respond to differential tax incentives by moving operations across the 
state line than establishments that are far apart.  We would thus expect θ to decrease (in 
absolute value) as equation (12a) is estimated for counties further away from the border.  This 
monotonicity hypothesis is evaluated with the following modified version of equation (12a), 
 
    dd d





where the superscript d denotes the distance between the population centroid for the initial 
county (c’) in a twin-county pair and the border.  Identifying θ
d for a particular, exact value of 
d is impossible since each county’s d is unique; rather, we consider in each regression a 40-
mile sample range, or window, of d’s.  We test whether the policy effect decreases with d by 
repeatedly estimating equation (13) for windows further and further away from zero.  (This 
approach is similar to analyses with rolling samples frequently used in time series 
econometric studies.)  Hereafter, we will use d to refer to the midpoint of a 40-mile sample 
window. 
 
5.2.  Empirical Results 
  To estimate equations (12) or (13), we must have an algorithm for establishing a pair 
of twin-counties.  We proceed to identify twin-counties in the following four steps.  First, we 
form the set of all pairs of counties.  For C total counties in the United States, there will be  
((C-1)*C) / 2 pairs of counties, where the subtraction of 1 adjusts for the impossibility of a 
county being a twin to itself and the division by 2 adjusts for redundant pair (where a 
redundant pair is defined as c’ pairing with c” and c” pairing with c’).  In the United States, 
there are approximately 3,000 counties and hence about 4.5 million pairs.  Second, we restrict 
this set to those pairs that are in bordering states.  Note that a given county, c’, will be paired 
with several counties because, on average, a state has four borders.  Third, for a given c’, 
there are several pairs in a given bordering state; we choose that county in a bordering state, 
c”, that is closest to c’, where closeness is measured by geographic distance -- determined by 
latitude and longitude data (provided by U.S. Census Bureau) using the Great Circle distance 
formula -- between the population centroids for c’ and c”.  This step yields approximately 
12,000 pairs, which we refer to as twin-counties.   
  As an example of the above procedure, consider Modoc county, which is in the 
Northeast corner of California.  California borders three states, Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona. 
 Our algorithm finds the Oregon county whose population centroid is closest to Modoc's 
population centroid and identifies this as the twin for the Modoc-Oregon (county-border) 
pair.  The process is then repeated for finding the closest county to Modoc in Nevada and 
identifying this as the twin for the Modoc-Nevada (county-border) pair, and, lastly, for 
finding the closest county to Modoc in Arizona and identifying this as the twin for the 
Modoc-Arizona (county-border) pair. The resulting dataset thus contains three twin-counties 




(its population centroid is 31 miles from the Oregon border, 35 miles from the Nevada 
border, and 558 miles from the Arizona border), this algorithm may also generate 
observations in which Modoc is identified as the second county (i.e., c”) and one of Modoc’s 
twins is the initial county (c’).  These redundant observations are excluded.    
  Estimation of equation (12) proceeds with this twin-county dataset with one 
additional restriction.  The twin-counties defined in the three-step procedure may nonetheless 
be very far from the border.  We restrict the twin-counties used in estimation to those for 
whom c’ and c” are within 40 miles of the border.
5  (To return to our example of Modoc 
county, this restriction would eliminate the Modoc-Arizona observation.)  Tighter restrictions 
yield relatively small samples and imprecise estimates; looser restrictions lead to larger 
samples but ones containing pairs that may not satisfy the key identifying assumption for 
nonpolicy effects.  This “40 mile border restriction,” coupled with the three-step algorithm, 
yields 1,883 twin-counties.  The resulting OLS estimated value of θ is -.058 with a standard 
error of .021.
6  Instrumental variable estimation of the Twin-Counties Model (with the first 
and second lags of the policy variable as instruments) yields very similar results; the 
estimated value of θ is -.064 with a standard error of .026.  Thus, we find that the number of 
manufacturing establishments in a county relative to its twin falls with the relative state-level 
user cost.  
To assess the monotonicity hypothesis (i.e., whether the relative user cost effect 
decreases (in absolute value) as counties get further from the border), we estimate equation 
(13) repeatedly for varying samples defined by the distance between the population centroid 
for the initial county (c’) in a twin-county pair and the border.  The first regression restricts 
twin-counties to those where the initial county is within 40 miles of the border; we refer to 
this dataset by its midpoint of d = 20.  The next restricts pairs to those where first county is 
between 1 and 41 miles from the border; then 2 to 42, 3 to 43, …, up to 60 to 100.  In other 
words, we repeatedly consider 40-mile sample windows in which the midpoint of distance-to-
border for the first county increases from 20 miles to 80 miles.   
Estimates of θ
d are shown in Figure 4.  The elasticity decreases (in absolute value) 
rapidly with d.  As we consider counties further and further away from the border, the effect 
of tax policy differentials evaporates.  In particular, we find that θ
d hits zero at a distance 
midpoint of 32 miles and then stays around zero with further increases in d.  A caveat with 
                                                 
5 As noted in Section 4, data on minimum distance between county population centroids and state 
borders comes from Holmes (1998) and is available on Holmes’ website. 




these results is that the 95% confidence intervals are relatively wide and only the first few θ
d's 
are significantly different from zero.  Notwithstanding this issue, the movement of the θ
d's 
toward zero can be explained by relocation or information costs increasing with distance.  
These frictions make it more difficult for firms in distant counties to take advantage of 
alternative tax regimes across the border and hence dominate the incentives offered by tax 
policy differentials.   
 
Figure 4.  Coefficients (OLS) on the policy variable by sample window
     Dependent Variable:   Cross-county difference in manufacturing employment
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6.  Summary And Conclusions  
  This paper is based on one fact, two questions, and three models.  The one fact is the 
dramatic increase in state investment incentives.  As documented in Figure 1, investment tax 
credits have become increasingly large and increasingly common among states.  In 2004, the 
average rate of the investment tax credit (for adopting states) is greater than 6%.   
  This increased usage and size of state investment credits leads to two questions:   Are 
these tax incentives effective in stimulating investment within the state?  How much of this 
increase is due to investment drawn away from other states?  
Based on a newly constructed panel dataset for all 50 states with over 20 years of 
data, we estimate three models to provide quantitative answers to these questions.  The 
Capital Demand Model is motivated by the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm 
and relates the capital/output ratio to the relative user cost of capital defined as the own-state 
user cost less the competitive-states user cost.  Controlling for fixed time and state effects 
proves important in obtaining economically and statistically significant user cost responses.   
The other two models relate the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing 
establishments at the county level.  The Spatial Discontinuity Model utilizes the information 
generated by spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) in tax policy at state borders.  The Twin-
Counties Model takes advantage of the panel structure of our data and exploits the "natural 
experiment" afforded by pairs of counties that are in the same geographic area but are 
separated by a state border.   
  Taken together, the estimates from these three models provide affirmative answers to 
the above two questions.  We find that own-state economic activity is positively affected by 
own-state tax incentives and is negatively affected by competitive-state tax incentives.  
Interstate capital flows, which are a necessary element for meaningful tax competition, 
appear to be quantitatively important.  Whether state investment incentives are a zero-sum 
game among the states is less certain and depends on the definition of the set of competitive 
states.  
  Future research needs to focus on obtaining a better understanding of the channels 
through which interstate tax competition might operate.  The results presented in this study 
provide important evidence on the quantitative importance of competitive-states user cost and 
the sensitivity of interstate capital flows.  But further work is needed in developing models 
with additional structure that can be estimated and that allow for a better understanding of tax 
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Data Appendix  
 
  This appendix describes the construction of and data sources for the data used in this 
study.  Four series describe output ( s,t Y ) and capital ( s,t K ), as well as their tax-adjusted 
prices,  Y
s,t P  and  K
s,t P , respectively.  The series are for the 50 states (indexed by subscript s) 
for the period 1963 to 2004 (indexed by subscript t), unless otherwise noted.
7  Each of the 
four series is described in a separate section.  Section 5 describes the data sources for a series 
on the number of manufacturing establishments ( s,t NE ).  The general organizing principle 
for each section is to first define the series mentioned above and then discuss the components 
for each series.  For each component, general issues concerning the construction of the series 
(if pertinent) and then data sources are discussed.  Section 6 contains a Legend describing 
abbreviations and sources.    
  The state data described in this paper measure economic activity in the manufacturing 
sector.  The primary raw source data for the state-level totals of output, investment, labor and 
establishments counts is the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) conducted by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  State-level totals (which the Census Bureau refers to as “AS-3” data) are 
reported in the yearly volumes of the ASM publication.  From 1994 onward, these data also 
can be found in the yearly ASM Geographic Area Statistics (ASM-GAS) publications.  
Hereafter, we will refer to the ASM data on state-level totals for all years as the ASM-GAS 
data.  The ASM data are collected from a large, representative sample of manufacturing 
establishments with one or more paid employees.  The 2004 ASM (Appendix B, p. B-1) 
defines the manufacturing sector as follows,    
“The Manufacturing sector comprises establishments engaged in the 
mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or 
components into new products.  The assembling of component parts of 
manufactured products is considered manufacturing, except in cases where the 
activity is appropriately classified in Sector 23, Construction.  Establishments 
in the manufacturing sector are often described as plants, factories, or mills 
and characteristically use power-driven machines and materials-handling 
equipment.  However, establishments that transform materials or substances 
into new products by hand or in the worker’s home and those engaged in 
selling to the general public products made on the same premises from which 
they are sold, such as bakeries, candy stores, and custom tailors, may also be 
included in this sector.  Manufacturing establishments may process materials 
or may contract with other establishments to process their materials for them.  
Both types of establishments are included in manufacturing.” 
                                                 
7 The most notable exception is that the Annual Survey of Manufacturers was not conducted from 





The ASM manufacturing sector corresponds to NAICS sectors 31 to 33.   
 
1.  OUTPUT  --   s,t Y  
  Output is measured by real value added, and it is defined as nominal value added 
divided by a price deflator, 
 
   BT,Y
s,t s,t mfg,t YY $ / P = ,  
 
where  s,t Y$  is nominal value added output and  BT,Y
mfg,t P  is the price index for manufacturing 
output net of sales and excise taxes but before corporate income tax adjustments.  Since the 
BT,Y
mfg,t P  series is based on producer price indices, it measures average prices received by 
domestic producers (PPI).  Our database presents  s,t Y  in billions of constant 2000 dollars. 
 The  s,t Y$  series is obtained from ASM GAS (e.g., in 2004, the data are published in 
Table 1, column F).  Our database presents  s,t Y$  in billions of dollars.  
 The  BT,Y
mfg,t P  series is obtained from INDUSTRY, the table labeled "Chain-Type Price 
Indexes for Value Added by Industry," Line 12.  Our database presents  BT,Y
mfg,t P  as an index 
number with a base year value in 2000 of 1.0.  
 
2.  PRICE OF OUTPUT (TAX-ADJUSTED)  --   Y
s,t P  
  The price of output (tax-adjusted) is defined as the price index for manufacturing 
output adjusted by the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal levels, 
 
   ()
Y BT,Y E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t mfg,t PP 1 ( ) =− τ + τ ,  
 
where  BT,Y
mfg,t P  is the price index for manufacturing output before tax adjustments (defined in 
Section 1),  E,S
s,t τ  is the effective corporate income tax rate at the state level, and  E,F
s,t τ  is the 




federal tax rate depends, in principle, on state tax parameters, and hence is subscripted by s.)  
The  BT,Y
mfg,t P  series was discussed in Section 1.  Since  BT,Y
mfg,t P  is the price of output paid by 
purchasers (per Section 1),  Y
s,t P  is the price of output received by producers.  Our database 
presents  Y
s,t P  as an index number with 2000 as the base year.  The two tax components are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
The Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate At The State Level  --   E,S
s,t τ  
  The effective corporate income tax rate at the state level is lower than the legislated 
(or statutory) corporate income tax rate ( L,S
t τ ) due to the deductibility (in some states) 
against state taxable income of taxes paid to the federal government.
8  Some states allow full 
deductibility of federal corporate income taxes from state taxable income, Iowa and Missouri 
allow only 50% deductibility, and some states allow no deductibility at all.  The deductibility 
provision in state tax codes is represented by  s,t {1.0,0.5,0.0} υ = , and the provisional 
effective corporate income tax rate at the state level is as follows, 
 
   #,E,S L,S #,E,F
s,t s,t t s,t (1 ) τ= τ− τ υ . 
 
The effect of federal income tax deducibility is represented by the provisional effective 
corporate income tax rate at the federal level (defined below).  (This formulation has been 
validated by "brute force" computations of state and federal taxes paid based on state and 
federal legislated tax rates.)   
 The  L,S
s,t s,t and τυ  series are obtained from several sources.  For recent years, data are 
obtained primarily from various issues of BOTS and STH, as well as actual state tax forms.  
Data for earlier years are obtained from various issues of BOTS and SFFF.  Additional 
information has been provided by TAXFDN.  Many states have multiple legislated tax rates 
that increase stepwise with taxable income; we measure  L,S
t τ  with the marginal legislated tax 
rate for the highest income bracket.  Our database presents   L,S
t τ  in percentage points (e.g., 
0.05) as opposed to basis points (e.g., 5).   
                                                 




The Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate At The Federal Level  --   E,F
s,t τ  
   The effective corporate income tax rate at the federal level is lower than the legislated 
corporate income tax rate ( L,F
t τ ) due to the deductibility against federal taxable income of 
taxes paid to the state.  The provisional effective corporate income tax rate at the federal level 
is as follows, 
 
   #,E,F L,F #,E,S
s,t t s,t (1 ) τ= τ− τ  
 
The effect of state income tax deducibility is represented by the effective corporate income 
tax rate at the state level.  (This formulation has been validated by "brute force" computations 
of state and federal taxes paid based on state and federal legislated tax rates.)  The  L,F
t τ  series 
is obtained from GRAVELLE, Table 2.1. Our database presents  L,F
t τ  in percentage points.  
  It has not generally been recognized that, owing to deductibility of taxes paid to 
another level of government, the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal 
levels are functionally related to each other.  As shown in the above equations, these 
interrelationships yield two equations in two unknowns, and thus can be solved for the 
effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal levels, respectively, as follows, 
 
   E,S L,S L,F L,S L,F
s,t s,t s,t s,t t s,t t 11 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ τ= τ − υ τ − υ τ τ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , 
   E,F L,F L,S L,S L,F
s,t s,t t s,t s,t t 11 ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ τ= τ − τ − υ τ τ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
The overall corporate income tax rate is the sum of  E,S E,F
s,t s,t and τ τ .  In the limiting case 
where federal corporate income taxes are not deductible against state taxable income 
( s,t 0 υ= ), this sum reduces to the more frequently used formula,  L,S L,F L,S L,F
s,t t s,t t * τ +τ −τ τ .   
 
3.  CAPITAL  --   s,t K  
  Capital input is measured by the real (constant-cost) replacement value of equipment 
(excluding software) and structures, and this series is constructed from the following 





   t
s,t s, mfg,t s.t K K (1 ) t 1,...,T I −τ
τ −δ + =τ+ = , 
  
where  s, K τ is the initial value of the real capital stock (where the index τ represents the 
initial period),  mfg,t δ  is the rate of economic depreciation (hence  mfg,t (1 ) −δ  is the survival 
rate), and  s,t I  is real total capital expenditure.  This definition departs in a small way from 
the one usually employed in capital stock construction by allowing the depreciation rate to 
vary over time.  The capital stock is dated end-of-period (EOP).  Our database presents  s,t K  
in billions of constant 2000 dollars.  Each component determining the capital stock is 
discussed in the following subsections.   
The Initial Value Of The Capital Stock  --   s,τ K 
 The  s, K τ series is measured by the book value of the capital stock adjusted for 
inflation, 
 
   ()
BV CoC HC
s, s, mfg, mfg, KK * K/ K ττ τ τ = , 
 
where  BV
s, K τ  is the book value (historical-cost) of the capital stock for state s,  CoC
mfg, K τ is the 
constant-cost value of the capital stock for the manufacturing sector, and  HC
mfg, K τ is the 
historical-cost value of the capital stock for the manufacturing sector.  All capital stock series 
are EOP.  Inflation drives a wedge between book value capital stocks (based on the original 
purchase cost of investment) and real capital stocks useful in economic analyses.  The 
()
CoC HC
mfg, mfg, K/ K ττ  ratio provides an approximate adjustment for the inflation wedge based on 
national manufacturing industry data.  Our database presents  s, K τ in billions of constant 
2000 dollars.   
  We compute initial values of the real capital stock EOP for  1962 τ =  and  1981 τ= .  
Note we “re-initialize” the capital stock in 1981 (as opposed to simply using the perpetual 
inventory formula starting with the 1962 initial stock estimate) for two reasons.  First, the 
1962 initial stock is estimated (as described below) rather than observed and so we do not 




missing for 1979 to 1981.  Thus, the initial capital stock for 1981, based on book value data, 
likely is a better measure of the true capital stock in 1981 than a capital stock measure based 
in part on imputed investment data from 1979 to 1981. 
  A provisional estimate of  s,1962 K ,  #
s,1962 K , is estimated by solving backward  using 
the perpetual inventory formula, beginning with the 1975 data on the book value of capital 
(adjusted for inflation), subtracting investment data from 1963 to 1975, and weighting these 
terms by survival rates, 
 
  
# # (1975 1962)
s,1962 s,1975 1975
(1975 1962 1)
(1975 1962 j)Is,1975 j
j0















    ( )
#B V C o C H C
s,1975 s,1975 mfg,1975 mfg,1975 KK * K/ K =  
 
The first part of the first of the equations above starts with the 1975 book value of capital 
(adjusted for inflation) and adds back all of the 1962 capital stock that has depreciated since 
1962.  The second part then subtracts   all of the investments made from 1963 to 1975, after 
adding back to each year’s investment the portion that has depreciated from when the 
investment was made and   1962.  In essence, this formula undoes all of the additions to and 
depreciation from the original capital stock of 1962 and subsequent investments from 1963 to 
1975.  Note we choose 1975 as the year from which to work backwards since it is the earliest 
year in which book value data are available from the ASM.   
The final estimate of  s,1962 K  is then obtained by rescaling the provisional state 
estimates by the national real capital stock total in 1962 from the BEA,  CoC




#C o C #
s,1962 s,1962 mfg,1962 s,1962
s1






A potential inconsistency exists in using the BEA data to rescale our provisional estimate 
based on ASM data.  Software investment is included in the BEA data but excluded in the 
ASM data.  During the early 1960's, the discrepancy introduced by software investment is 
tiny.  In 1963, software investment was 1.3% of manufacturing investment (though software 




of software investment is likely less than this figure for two reasons.  First, for the vintages of 
investment entering the 1962 capital stock, their share is likely to be even smaller than 1.3%.  
Second, software depreciates more rapidly than other capital.  It would seem safe to conclude 
that that the discrepancy owing to the different treatment of software investment is less than 
1% of the 1962 capital stock.   
 The  BV
s, K τ  series is obtained from ASM (e.g., in 1975, the data are published in Table 
4, row 5).  Our database presents  BV
s, K τ  in billions of dollars.   
 The  CoC
mfg, K τ series is the product of a quantity index and a base year value that 
converts the index into a real stock,   
 
   CoC CoC CuC
mfg, mfg, mfg,t 2000 K INDEXK *K ττ = = ,  
 
where  CoC
mfg, INDEXK τ is the chain-type quantity index for the real capital stock and 
CuC
mfg,t 2000 K =  is the base year value for the current-cost value of the capital stock for the 
manufacturing sector.  Our database presents  CoC
mfg, K τ in millions of dollars.  The 
CoC
mfg, INDEXK τ is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.2, line 7, and this series is divided by 100.  
Our database presents  CoC
mfg, INDEXK τ as an index number with a base year value in 2000 of 
1.0.  The  CuC
mfg,t 2000 K =  datapoint is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.1, line 7.  Our database 
presents  CuC
mfg,t 2000 K =  in millions of dollars.  
   The  HC
mfg, K τ series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.3, line 7.   Our database presents 
HC
mfg, K τ in millions of dollars.  
The Rate Of Economic Depreciation  --   mfg,t δ  
 The  mfg,t δ  series is measured by the flow of annual depreciation divided by the 












δ= ,          
where  CuC
mfg,t D  is the current-cost flow of depreciation in manufacturing industries and 
CuC
mfg,t 1 K −  is the current-cost capital stock in manufacturing industries.  Our database presents 
mfg,t δ  in percentage points. 
 The  CuC
mfg,t D  series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.4, line 7.  Our database presents 
CuC
mfg,t D  in millions of dollars.  
    The  CuC
mfg,t 1 K −  series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.1, line 7.  Our database 
presents  CuC
mfg,t 1 K −  in millions of dollars.  
Real Total Capital Expenditure  --   s,t I   
  Real total capital expenditure is defined as nominal capital expenditures deflated by a 











   NEW USED
s,t s,t s,t I$ I$ I$ + = , 
 
where  s,t I$ ,  NEW
s,t I$ , and  USED
s,t I$  are total, new, and used nominal capital expenditures, 
respectively, and  I
mfg,t P  is the price deflator for investment for the manufacturing sector.  
Our database presents  s,t I  in billions of constant 2000 dollars.  The  s,t I$  and  I
mfg,t P s e r i e s  
are discussed in the following subsections.  
    Total Nominal Capital Expenditure  --   s,t I$  
 The  s,t I$  series is obtained in three different ways each of which are based on the 
ASM-GAS and depend on disjoint time periods.  (This mixture of direct and indirect 




represents nominal expenditures on equipment (excluding software) and structures.  Our 
database presents  s,t I$  in billions of dollars.  
  For 1977, 1978, and 1982 to 2004, the series is obtained directly from ASM-GAS 
(e.g, in 2004, the data are published in Table 2, column I).   
  For 1963 to 1976, the ASM-GAS only publishes data for  NEW
s,t I$ .  For these years, 
s,t I$  is derived based on a state's mean ratio of  NEW





s,t s,t s s,v s,v I$ I$ * MEAN I$ /I$
t 1963,...,1976






where the  s MEAN {.} is computed separately for each state and over all available 
observations represented by the index v.    
  For 1979 to 1981, the ASM was not conducted, and hence no ASM-GAS source data 
are available for  s,t I$ ,  NEW
s,t I$ , nor  s,t Y .  The missing investment data for these three years 
are estimated with the following three-step procedure.  First, we rely on the availability of 
alternative output data from BEA for these three years and the workhorse of investment 
theory, the accelerator model, to estimate the missing total capital expenditure data.  Output 
is defined as real Gross State Product (GSP) for the manufacturing sector.
9  With these data 
and the available data for  s,t I , we estimate the following flexible accelerator model,    
 
  
'' ' ' '
s,t s,t s s,0 s,t s,t 1 s,1 s,t 1 s,t 2
''
s,2 s,t 2 s,t 3 s,t
I/ Y ( Y/ Y ) ( Y / Y )
(Y / Y )
t 1977, 1978, 1982, ..., 2004
−− −
−−





where  s α  is a state-specific constant capturing state fixed effects, the  s 's β  are state-specific 
slope parameters,  s,t ε  is an error term, and  '
s,t Y  is real manufacturing GSP.  The  '
s,t Y  series 
is nominal manufacturing GSP divided by a price deflator.  Nominal manufacturing GSP is 
                                                 
9 For all intents and purposes, Gross State Product is conceptually identical to Gross Domestic 




obtained from the BEA’s Regional Economic Accounts (REA) data.  (In 1997, the data are 
reported on both SIC and NAICS bases; we use the SIC figures.)  The deflator is 
BT,Y
mfg,t P discussed in Section 1.   
  Second, we use the estimated parameters (represented by ^ 's over the α and the β's), 
data for  '
s,t Y  and  I
s,t P  , and a transformed version of the above equation to generate a 
provisional estimate of  s,t I$ ( #
s,t I$ ) for the missing nominal capital expenditure observations, 
 
 
#' ' ' ' ' '
s,t s s,0 s,t s,t 1 s,1 s,t 1 s,t 2 s,2 s,t 2 s,t 3
'I
s,t s,t
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ I$ ( Y /Y ) ( Y /Y ) ( Y /Y )
*Y *P
t 1979, 1980, 1981





  Third, for each year (1979, 1980, 1981), we rescale states’ nominal investment so that 
it equals the national total,  ASM
mfg,t I$ , which we estimate by applying the growth rate of the 
BEA’s nominal private nonresidential fixed investment (net of software) for the 
manufacturing sector, I$mfg,t, to the previous year’s value of national investment reported in 
the ASM.  Specifically, we multiply each state’s provisional estimate by the ratio of national 
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The  mfg,t I$  series is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.7, line 7 less the sum of software 
investment   over all manufacturing industries (NAICS sectors 31 to 33) from DETAILED, 
row 9.     
  The ASM-GAS data for  s,t I$  need to be adjusted for additional missing values and an 
error.  The additional missing values occur because the ASM-GAS did not report data for 
Minnesota for the years 1970 and 1971.  We use the relation between BEA data for the 
manufacturing sector and state data for Minnesota on investment expenditures to impute the 







I$ MEAN * I$
I$
t 1970, 1971
v 1967, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1973, 1974
=
=






where  mfg,t I$  is nominal capital expenditures on new and used capital by the manufacturing 
sectors defined above and the mean of the ratio is computed for three years before and after 
the missing values.  The  mfg,t I$  series was discussed previously in this subsection. 
  The error occurs for  s ohio,t 1996 I$ == .  In 1996, ASM-GAS shows a 400% jump in 
nominal total capital expenditures in Ohio from about $8 billion in 1995 to $40 billion in 
1996 and then back down to $9 billion in 1997.  This enormous jump can be traced to the 
motor vehicles sector ($35 billion), which suggests a huge capital investment – equal to 85% 
of the sector’s national capital expenditures – for the building of an auto plant(s) in Ohio in 
1996.  We dismiss this number for three reasons.  First, the magnitude of this investment is 
implausible.  By comparison, DaimlerChrysler's jeep plant expansion in Toledo in 1998 was 
$1.2 billion of total investment over several years.  Second, correspondence with experts on 
the Ohio manufacturing sector (including one at the Ohio Department of Economic 
Development) could not confirm any massive capital expenditure programs in 1996.  Third, 
the 1996 value for national total capital expenditures reported in the ASM-GAS is 
inconsistent with and about $32 billion higher than a comparable figure reported in a separate 
ASM publication, Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries (ASM-SIGI).  These two 
publications disagree on national capital expenditures only in 1996, suggesting an error is 




  We fill in the 1996 Ohio data point by simply taking national manufacturing capital 
expenditures from the alternative ASM publication, ASM-SIGI, and subtracting the sum of 
capital expenditures from all other states. 
   Price Deflator For Investment  --   I
mfg,t P 











where  mfg,t I$  and  mfg,t I  are nominal and real total capital expenditures, respectively, for the 
manufacturing sector.  Our dataset presents  I
mfg,t P  as an index number with a base year value 
in 2000 of 1.0. 
 The  mfg,t I$  series was discussed in the preceding subsection (Total Nominal Capital 
Expenditure).    
 The  mfg,t I  series is the product of a quantity index and a base year value that converts 
the index into real investment expenditures, 
 
   mfg,t mfg,t mfg,t 2000 I INDEXI *I$ = = , 
 
where  mfg,t INDEXI  is the chain-type quantity index for real investment expenditures and 
mfg,t 2000 I$ =  the base year value for current investment expenditures.  Our database presents 
mfg,t I  in billions of dollars.  The  mfg,t INDEXI  is obtained from FIXED, Table 4.8, line 7, 
and this series is divided by 100.  Our database presents  mfg,t INDEXI  as an index number 
with a base year value in 2000 of 1.0.  The series containing the  mfg,t 2000 I$ =  datapoint was 









4.  PRICE OF CAPITAL (TAX-ADJUSTED)  --   K
s,t P  
  The price of capital (tax-adjusted) is defined as the product of three objects reflecting 
tax credits and deductions ( s,t TAX ), the purchase price of the capital good ( s,t PRICE ), and 
the opportunity costs of holding depreciating capital ( s,t OPPCOST ),   
 
   K
s,t s,t s,t s,t P TAX *PRICE *OPPCOST = ,     
   
()
L,S L,F E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t t s,t s,t
E,S E,F
s,t s,t s,t
TAX 1 ITC ITC ( )TD
1( ) P T
=− − −τ + τ
+− τ + τ
,    
     I
s,t mfg,t PRICE P = ,     
    s,t t mfg,t OPPCOST = ρ+ δ ,     
 
where  L,S
s,t ITC  and  L,F
t ITC  are the legislated investment tax credit rates at the state and 
federal levels, respectively,  E,S
s,t τ  and  E,F
t τ  are the effective corporate income tax rates at the 
state and federal levels, respectively,  s,t TD  is the present value of tax depreciation 
allowances at the federal level,  s,t PT  is the present value of property tax payments at the state 
level,  I
mfg,t P  is the price deflator for investment in the manufacturing sector,  s,t ρ  is the 
financial cost of capital, and  t δ  is the economic depreciation rate.  The  K
s,t P  series and its 
eight components are stated at an annual rate and in continuous time.  Four of the 
components have been discussed previously --  E,S
s,t τ ,  E,F
s,t τ ,  I
mfg,t P,  a n d   mfg,t δ ; the remaining 
four components are discussed in the following subsections.  Note that the user cost of 
capital, which was introduced by JORGENSON in 1963 and extended by, among others, 
HALL-JORGENSON, GRAVELLE, JORGENSON-YUN, and KING-FULLERTON, equals 
K
s,t P  divided by  Y
s,t P  (the latter discussed in Section 2).  
The Legislated Investment Tax Credit, State  --   L,S
s,t ITC  
  The state investment tax credit is a credit against state corporate income tax liabilities.  




investment tax credit rate ( L,S
s,t ITC ) multiplied by the value of capital expenditures put into 
place within the state in a tax year.  The effective rate is lower than the legislated rate in a 
handful of states for two reasons.  First, five states (Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, North 
Carolina, and Ohio) permit the state investment tax credit to be applied only to equipment.  
Since equipment investment is approximately 85% of ASM total national investment, we 
multiply  L,S
s,t ITC  by 0.85 for these five states.  Second, several states require basis 
adjustments deducting the amount of the credit from the asset basis for depreciation purposes; 
this adjustment is considered in the subsection on the Present Value of Tax Depreciation 
Allowances.   
 The  L,S
s,t ITC  series is obtained directly from states’ online corporate tax forms and 
instructions.  For most states with an investment tax credit, both current and historical credit 
rates are provided in the current year instructions (since companies applying for a credit 
based on some past year’s investment apply that year’s credit rate rather than the current 
rate).  In those few cases where some or all historical rates were missing from the online 
forms and instructions, the missing rates are obtained via direct communication with the 
state’s department of taxation.  In some states, the legislated investment tax credit rate varies 
by the level of capital expenditures; we use the legislated credit rate for the highest tier of 
capital expenditures.  Our database presents  L,S
s,t ITC  in percentage points.    
The Legislated Investment Tax Credit Rate, Federal  --   L,F
t ITC   
  The federal investment tax credit enters the price of capital in a manner similar to that 
of  S,F
s,t ITC  and is a credit against federal corporate income tax liabilities.  In general, the 
effective amount of the investment tax credit is simply the legislated investment tax credit 
rate ( L,F
t ITC ) multiplied by the value of capital expenditures put into place in a tax year.  The 
effective credit rate is lower than the legislated credit rate because of basis adjustments 
specifying that the amount of the credit must be deducted from the asset basis for 
depreciation purposes; this adjustment is considered in the subsection on the Present Value of 




  Legislated investment tax credit rates generally increase with asset lives (as 
determined by the tax authorities).  Thus, the  L,F
t ITC  series is a weighted-average of the 
legislated investment tax credit rates by equipment+software asset type ( L,F


























where the weights are the ratio of the current-cost capital stock for asset a to the total over 22 
nonresidential equipment assets.  (Note that software assets, which are excluded from our 
measure of capital, are not included in the 22 nonresidential equipment assets used to 
compute the  a,t ω weights.)  We thus assume that weights based on data for the nonresidential 
sector are appropriate for the manufacturing sector.  Current-cost capital stocks are used in 
computing weights because the divisia-aggregated constant-cost capital stocks are not 
additive across components.   
 The  L,F
a,t ITC  series is obtained from GRAVELLE, Table B3.  Our database presents 
L,F
a,t ITC  in percentage points.  
 The  CuC
a,t 1 K −  series are obtained from FIXED, Table 2.1, lines 3 to 34.  Our database 
presents  CuC
a,t 1 K −  in millions of dollars.   
The Present Value of Tax Depreciation Allowances  --   s,t TD  
  Tax depreciation allowances accrue over the useful life of the asset.  We have 
assumed that the value of TDs,t is 0.70 for all s and t.  
The Present Value Of Property Tax Payments  --   s,t PT  
  The formula for the present value of property tax payments ( s,t PT ) is conceptually 
similar to the one for the present value of tax depreciation allowances.  Both involve a stream 




stream involves tax payments beginning in period t and extending into the indefinite future 
based on the remaining value of the asset.   
 The  s,t PT  series is constructed according to the following formula stated in 
continuous time,  
 
   s,t mfg,t () ( v t )
s,t s,t
t
PT e ptr dv
∞
−ρ + δ −
= ∫ , 
   
where  s,t ρ  is the nominal discount rate equal to the financial cost of capital,  mfg,t δ  is the rate 
of economic depreciation for the manufacturing sector, and  s,t ptr  is the effective property tax 
rate on business property, which varies across states and over time.  Conceptually, the 
variable  s,t ptr  equals property taxes paid to the state and all its localities by businesses 
divided by the market value of business property.  Thus, it is useful to express  s,t ptr  as, 
 
   ( ) ( ) s,t s,t s,t i,t t i ptr 0.404*PTREV K K *BUS_ASSETS ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , 
 
where PTREVs,t is property tax revenues of state and local governments within state s, and 
BUS_ASSETSt is tangible assets owned by the nonfarm corporate business sector (from 
Table B.102 of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Flow of Funds data).  Assets data is 
not available at the state-level; thus, as indicated in the above formula, national business 
assets are allocated to the states in proportion to the state’s share of national capital stock. 
  We use the period t values of  s,t ρ  and  s,t ptr  in computing the period t present value 
of property tax payments, thus assuming static expectations for the discount and property tax 
rates used in this specific computation.  We further assume that the assessed market value 
depreciates over time at rate  mfg,t δ .  The above equation can be integrated to obtain the 
following expression for the present value of property tax payments, which is similar to an 
annuity, 
 





  The series for PTREVs,t is obtained from the Census of Governments (CG).  CG 
provides data on PTREV for years 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 
2001; data for other years in the range 1961-2004 are filled in via linear interpolation 
(through 2000) or extrapolation (2002-2004).  Our database presents  s,t ptr  in percentage 
points.  
 
The Financial Cost Of Capital  --   s,t ρ  
  The financial cost of capital is the real discount rate applied to cash flows accruing 
over a long horizon and is assumed to be equal to 0.10 for all t.  
 
5.  NUMBER OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS  --   s,t NE  
  The number of manufacturing establishments is measured by the  s,t NE  series is 
obtained from County Business Patterns (CBP; e.g., for 2004, the data are published in row, 
NAICS=”31-----“, column “est”).  The coverage of the CBP begins in 1977, but it has the 
advantage of being available continuously through 2004.  In our database,  s,t NE  is presented 
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URL:  http://www.census.gov/mcd/asm-as1.html. 
                                                 
10 In describing the raw data, some of the text in this paper has been taken directly from government 






BEA:      Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
   URL:    http://www.bea.gov. 
 
BLS:      Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 
   URL:    http://www.bls.gov. 
 
BOP:    Beginning-Of-Period  t. 
 
BOTS:     The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States (The  
Council of State Governments : Lexington, Kentucky, Various Issues).  
 
CCHTB:    CCH Tax Briefing:  Corporate Income Tax and 'Bonus' Depreciation  
   Special  Report (December 4, 2003).  URL:  http://tax.cchgroup.com/ 
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CENSUS:    Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce.   
   URL:    http://www.census.gov. 
 
CG:      Census of Governments, Volume 2 (Various Years). 
 
CM: CENSUS,  Census of Manufacturers (Various Years).  Publications for 
1997 and 2002 are available online.  URL for the 2002 edition: 
 http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0231sg1t.pdf. 
 
CPB:    CENSUS,  County Business Patterns. 
URL:  http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/download/cbpdownload.html.  
 
DETAILED:  BEA, Detailed Fixed Assets Tables, Nonresidential Investment,  
  Historical-Cost.  URL:  
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/FA2004/Details/xls/detailnonres_inv1.xls 
 
EOP:    End-Of-Period  t. 
 
ERP:      Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President  
      (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).  
 
FIXED:   BEA, Standard Fixed Asset Tables. 
   URL:    http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/FA2004/SelectTable.asp. 
 
FOF:      Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds  
   Accounts  of  the  United  States  (Washington:  Board of Governors of the  
      Federal Reserve System, various issues).  URL:  http://www.  
   federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/Current/annuals/a1995-2005.pdf. 
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